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David Laitin defies a famous binary classification of schol-
ars between hedgehogs and foxes. The late Isaiah Berlin’s
work, following Tolstoy’s, gave this distinction considerable
currency in the social sciences. The hedgehog knows one
thing very well; and the fox knows quite a few things, if not
each in great detail.2 Hedgehogs work on one given topic/
theme/theory for an entire lifetime, adopting a cumulative re-
search program, attempting to resolve one puzzle at a time, as
they advance. Think of Arend Lijphart’s lifelong pursuit of the
idea of consociational democracy.
Foxes move from one big topic/theme/theory to another,
each topic keeping them engaged for a few years but not more,
showing enormous intellectual breadth in the process. Con-
sider Samuel Huntington in political science, and Amartya Sen
in political economy. Huntington has provoked new debates
in three fields of our profession: comparative politics, Ameri-
can politics, and international politics. Sen ranges from ratio-
nality on one hand to famines and poverty, inequality, choice
of techniques in planning, and, increasingly, identity on the
other.
Laitin has worked almost entirely on ethnic politics, rarely
if ever on development, economic reforms, democracy and auth-
oritarianism, party politics, etc., let alone in other subfields of
the political science discipline. Yet three things separate his
work from a classic hedgehog strategy. His substantive ques-
tions have varied, even if the subfield has not; he has moved
from country to country in search of answers; and what is
most pertinent to this symposium, his methodological commit-
ments have radically changed over time.
Three of Laitin’s books deal with language politics. In
Politics, Language and Thought: The Somali Experience
(1977), Laitin probed the political and social consequences of
maintaining a neocolonial language like English, as opposed
to using a vernacular like Somali, as an official language. In
Language Repertoire and State Construction in Africa (1992),
he explained how very few African states went for linguistic
rationalization in the classical European sense of having only
one language, but many others went for two other linguistic
strategies: a 2-language outcome, and what he came to call a
3+1 solution, a formula he found in India and has applied to
other countries as well. In Identity in Formation: The Rus-
sian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (1998)–IF
hereafter—the central issue is how to explain the emergence
of a “conglomerate identity,” based primarily on linguistic
adaptation, among the Russian-speaking populations of Es-
tonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan after the breakup of
the Soviet Union.
His work on identity politics is, of course, not entirely
driven by language issues. In his second book, Hegemony
and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the
Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I merely wanted to describe Laitin’s work in
terms of ethnography and rational choice, not evaluate it. The
differences are clear across the three pieces. It is also obvious
that each piece produces different kinds of knowledge, espe-
cially with respect to the expected generalizability of the find-
ings. In HC, a rationalist theory of identity has been married to
a particular set of empirical circumstances. In IF, a more elabo-
rate rationalist theory of identity has been tested in a much
larger, though still bounded, domain. In EIC, a universalist
theory of identity has been tested nowhere, but has been dem-
onstrated valid within a set of ultra-constraining assumptions.
Is the obvious true? Is ethnography the enemy of gener-
alization? Perhaps in practice, but not in principle. Wedeen
(2002) has recently written about the possibility of collecting
intersubjective data based on phenomena such as identity, so
that conceptualization of variables need not be derived exclu-
sively from a priori theories, but rather can remain true to the
ways in which concepts are understood in context. This would
provide more reliable and valid data for those with statistical
inclinations, for those who wish to specify survey and focus
group instruments, and for those who wish to construct mod-
els with grounding in some reality.
The objective should be to return to Laitin’s original in-
sight. Theories of political action, of identity, of mobilization
and identification require accounts of preferences that are not
merely assigned, but theorized and empirically uncovered. And
preferences themselves are not just the oral statements or writ-
ten testimonies of subjects, but are embodied in their mundane
daily practices. Ethnography, in this sense, is necessary for
rational choice to produce creditable knowledge claims of any
kind.
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Yorubas (1986)–HC hereafter—Laitin asked why Yorubaland’s
religious life was split between Muslims and Christians, but
Muslim-Christian differences were not the principal cleavage
in Yoruba politics. Finally, in two co-written articles with James
Fearon (Fearon and Laitin 1995, 2003), he has examined the
consequences of ethnic diversity for peace and violence. In
the first joint article, Fearon and Laitin probed the conditions
under which ethnic diversity would actually lead to peace, not
violence; and in the second article, they asked whether ethnic
diversity was indeed a crucial determinant of civil wars, or
whether other factors were more significant.
The range of these questions makes Laitin a formidable
intellectual force, indeed a central figure, in the subfield of
ethnic politics. One can no longer write about language poli-
tics, identity formation, or ethnic peace and violence without
engaging his arguments. Moreover, his frequent forays into
new empirical terrains add greatly to his output. His case ma-
terials have come from Somalia, Nigeria, India, Sri Lanka,
Catalonia, the Baltic Republics, Central Asia, and Ukraine. As
my own research has become multi-country, it is now clear to
me that developing intimacy with new political and cultural
materials, a prerequisite for thoughtful work, is not easy. Con-
sequently, I have developed a strong admiration for those
who step beyond the existing zones of familiarity and develop
ideas on that basis. Laitin has repeatedly allowed his intellec-
tual curiosity to migrate to newer lands, also sometimes lin-
guistically retooling himself. Many have worked on multiple
countries; very few have learned new languages. Laitin may
have never left the subfield of ethnic politics, but his intellec-
tual journeys within have a fox-like quality.
Laitin’s substantive achievements are not the principal
issues for this symposium. Rather, our focus is on his meth-
odological moves. The symposium seeks to assess the value
of Laitin’s methodological voyage from his early work based
primarily on ethnography, whether in Somalia or in Ile Ife in
Yorubaland, Nigeria, to his work over the last decade and a
half, in which a rational choice stance has played a major role.
But before I proceed further, one should note that eth-
nography and rational choice are not the only methodological
alternatives which should be discussed here. Rational choice
methodology, which does tend to rely heavily on formal logic
and a priori assumptions, as opposed to ethnography which
is more empirically driven, is only one of the elements in Laitin’s
transformation. Some of his more recent work is heavily sta-
tistical, and we must draw a distinction between formal and
statistical reasoning. If in “Explaining Interethnic Coopera-
tion” (1995; EIC hereafter), assumptions, formal reasoning,
and equations abound, and only illustrations from the real
world are given but no systematic empirical evidence, in
“Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” (2003; EICW hereaf-
ter), there are only a few basic assumptions made and re-
course to formal logic is minimal. Instead, existing theories of
civil war are tested against a large statistical dataset. This
kind of work is not ethnographic but it is still empirical, to be
differentiated from the rational choice tilt of the EIC.
So how should we judge Laitin’s methodological trans-
formation? My central argument in this essay is that methods
always entail a tradeoff. Each method in the social sciences
can handle some puzzles better, leaving others unresolved. It
is not as helpful to say that ethnography is better than ratio-
nal choice, as to determine what their respective strengths
are, and what they can handle best. Creative imagination can
allow us to blunt the edges of the tradeoff, but the tradeoffs
do not altogether disappear.
In what follows, I will discuss this idea concerning each
of the methods Laitin has deployed: ethnography, surveys,
and formal modeling. I will primarily use his work as an illus-
tration of tradeoffs, though in the process I will also discuss
other work. All three methods have their unique mix of
strengths and weaknesses, and we need to decipher what
kinds of questions can be best analyzed by each. It is both a
question about the strategy and substance of research.  Laitin
has not always been conscious of this point, nor has he con-
sistently followed it. Since he subscribes to the notion of
cumulation in social science, his recent critiques on purely
methodological grounds seem quite puzzling and paradoxical.
Basically, the form his critique has taken and his commitment
to the idea of cumulation are not logically consistent.
Shifts of Evidence, Shifts of Method
Theoretical shifts, especially in light of changing evi-
dence, are quite common in scholarly life. Robert Dahl became
skeptical about the pluralist nature of American democracy,
once the tight hold of business over American politics be-
came clear to him in the 1970s (Dahl 1982). And as the revolu-
tions overthrowing Communism squarely questioned his as-
sumptions about human behavior, Jon Elster developed seri-
ous self-doubt about rational choice theories in the early 1990s
(Elster 2000).
These are examples of evidence-based theoretical shifts.
Are Laitin’s shifts evidence-driven, or method-driven? In his
thoughtful essay for this symposium, Ted Hopf (2005) sug-
gests that the reasons are methodological.
But are methodological shifts entirely uncommon? In one
of the famous interpretations of Marx’s overall body of work,
Louis Althusser argued that there was an “epistemological
break” in Marx after his early work—before Das Kapital was
written (Althusser 1969).  According to Althusser, “early Marx”
moved from the pseudo-scientific methods, when he gave too
much emphasis to human consciousness, to science later when
he made it unambiguously clear that the structure of produc-
tion determined the relations of production and, therefore,
human consciousness. Epistemology is about the ways of
generating knowledge. Willy nilly, it becomes inescapably
methodological.
In short, method-based theoretical turns have precedence
in intellectual history. Like Marx in his later works, Laitin to-
day tends to start with some universalist, apriori assump-
tions. Laitin, of course, does not leave it there, and unlike so
many rational choice scholars, he does field work as well.  But
given that his survey questions are based on apriori theory,
says Hopf, his empirical testing has become partial:
I could not find a single case where ethnographic data
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tics and in quite intense forms–open-ended, collecting narra-
tives about them and postcoding them (once narratives have
been collected) is perhaps one of the best ways to go. This
survey strategy is different from following a theoretically de-
termined finite-answers form and, therefore, a precodable for-
mat, as is typical of standard surveys. I am currently experi-
menting with such survey designs in my own research in four
countries. The upcoming results will show how far the rede-
signed survey technique works. Basically, those who survey
do not collect narratives, and those who collect narratives do
not survey, but there is no theoretical reason to see them as
irreconcilable methodological adversaries. They can be sub-
stantially combined, blunting the edges of the tradeoff.4
Methods and Explanations
This said, another side of Hopf’s methodological critique
remains. Following his point about how method is deployed
in HC as opposed to IF, one could also see the basic change
in Laitin’s position on what structural transformations do to
human choices. In IF, Laitin argues that after a structural trans-
formation brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union, the
Russian-speakers in the Near Abroad calculated whether lin-
guistic assimilation was in their interest or not. In HC, Laitin
had said something dramatically different. The Yoruba did not
calculate, when faced with the clear possibility of structural
transformation in their political arena. The fascinating ques-
tion for Laitin’s inquiry during his Ile Ife field work became the
following: why would the Yoruba still stick to a tribal (ances-
tral city) identity rather than a religious (Muslim vs. Christian)
one, even though a Civil War in Nigeria during 1967-70 at-
tempted to redefine Nigeria into a Muslim North and Christian
South, and again, when in the late 1970s, a debate on whether
there should be a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal sought to do
the same? In their religious life, the Yoruba acted as Muslims
and Christians, but they remained politically committed to
their tribal identity, refusing to react religiously to the cata-
clysmic political events. Why?
Laitin explains why rational choice is unable to help him
answer this question:
Rational choice theorists...cannot tell us if ultimately but-
ter is better than guns; it can tell us that at a certain point
the production of a small number of guns will cost us a
whole lot of butter, and at that point it is probably irratio-
nal to produce more guns. Within a political structure,
individuals constantly make marginal decisions. [Ratio-
nal choice] theories can give us a grasp on how indi-
vidual political actors are likely to make choices within
that structure.
[Rational choice] theory cannot, however, handle
long-term and non-marginal decisions. When market
structures are themselves threatened, and people must
decide whether to work within the new structure or hold
on to the old–without an opportunity for a marginal deci-
sion–microeconomic theory is not applicable...Structural
transformations–changing the basic cleavage structure
of a society–are not amenable to the tools of micro-eco-
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were advanced as evidence in contradiction to the sur-
vey data, or still less, as evidence to interpret the survey
data that were gathered. The intersubjective world of post-
Soviet subjects was accorded far less evidentiary value
than the answers to survey questionnaires, questions
which were developed in light of a priori theories of the
researcher, not from the ethnographic materials he gath-
ered (Hopf 2006, 18).
This way of generating knowledge, Hopf continues, is
“directly opposed” to the celebrated opening lines of Hege-
mony and Culture (HC):
When we try to interpret politics in Africa (or anywhere,
of course!) in terms of our own structures of preference
and categories of action, we learn less about either Afri-
cans or ourselves than we do by recognizing that our
political understanding is not universal, but is contin-
gent on our sociological and historical experiences.” (HC,
ix).
Hopf is insightfully identifying the difference between
surveys and ethnographies here. Though scholars select their
ethnographic sites for theoretical reasons, surveys are more
theory laden than ethnography. Survey questions are theo-
retically framed: only some questions are asked, not all pos-
sible questions. Ethnography facilitates a much more open-
ended “soaking and poking” and, as Hopf puts it, “it lets the
subject speak.”
Hopf is right about this, but it is also worth asking whether
ethnography has some limitations and surveys some advan-
tages. Ethnography clearly allows us to deepen, but surveys
make broadening possible. Deepening and broadening as cat-
egories of empirical observation generate trade-offs. Ethnog-
raphy makes accuracy about a case or two possible in a way
that surveys can not match; but surveys allow a broader range
of observation, covering many more cases than ethnography
can possibly do. I find Laitin’s belief in Identity in Formation
(IF) that ethnography alone would not take him forward in the
Near Abroad well founded.
Though HC and IF seem to be asking the same broad
question–namely, what explains the choice of certain identi-
ties as opposed to others–the scale of observation is clearly
different.  In HC,  Ile Ife was studied in depth and an assump-
tion was made that it was a microcosm of the entire Yorubaland.
In IF, unlike HC, four countries were observed. Surveys inevi-
tably had to be given greater weight than ethnography.  Hopf
seems to suggest that Laitin should have done in Narva, his
base in Estonia, what he did in Ile Ife, but seeing all of Estonia
through the prism of Narva, let alone three other societies,
was not the purpose of Laitin’s research. Nor might it have
been a sensible methodological strategy.3
This does, however, lead to an important question: can
surveys be designed in such a way that they pick up some of
the strengths of ethnography? A fuller discussion of this issue
will lead us too far in a cognate area. It will suffice to note that
making the survey questions about ambiguities, anxieties, fear
and hopes—emotions that so often accompany identity poli-
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nomic theory...  (HC, 148-9, parenthesis and emphasis
added).
Identity choice was not a marginal, but a structural deci-
sion.  Rational choice arguments, therefore, were inapplicable.5
What would apply instead?
….Gramsci provides the solution….The model of he
gemonic control can help explain the reification of the
“tribe” in African politics–why that cleavage became the
dominant metaphor for political action and why it per-
sisted... (HC, 150).
To explore how hegemony was created, Laitin then goes
into history, fixing his gaze on the British colonial period,
starting in the late 19th century:
Claims based on religious identity were expunged from
the political arena by British administrators...British
administration shied away from the promotion of Chris-
tianity… British administrators…feared the revolution-
ary implications of religious fanaticism  (HC, 154).
Finally, Laitin sketches the impact of this decades-long
principle of British rule on the Yoruba:
The idea that ancestral city represents ‘blood’ while reli-
gion represents ‘choice’ is so deeply embedded into
commonsense thinking that experience and data demon-
strating otherwise fail to disabuse Yoruba people of this
‘truth’ (HC, 159).
This is fascinating puzzle-solving. In many parts of the
world, religion is often not seen as a matter of choice, even
though it is in principle. Religion is more often seen as an
unchangeable reality inherited from forefathers. Moreover, in
other parts of the British Empire, the colonial authorities chose
religion as a ruling strategy, for example in Northern Nigeria,
but in Yorubaland, they chose a different strategy, leaving a
quite different legacy. The distinctiveness of the institution-
alized commonsense of Yoruba politics, Laitin argues, is thus
linked to the contingencies of colonial rule.
Let us now ask how the impact of a structural transforma-
tion on identities is handled in the Near Abroad. The unravel-
ing of the Soviet system is in many ways conceptually analo-
gous to the Biafran Civil War. It ended a system as it existed,
without making it clear what would replace it instead. In HC,
“the politicization of communal identities cannot be fully un-
derstood by examining the logic of individual choices” (103).
In IF, whether or not Russian speakers assimilate is based on
a strategic interaction with other Russian speakers, concep-
tualized as a matter of individual choice in a tipping model.  In
HC, calculations about identity, if made at all, were thought to
take place in normal times, not in times of structural transfor-
mation, for the latter was marked by a radical uncertainty about
the future, making a cost-benefit calculus hard to practice.
“The level of costs and benefits of different forms of political
identification among the Yoruba is not at issue. For a Yoruba
to reformulate his political identity on the basis of his religion
would involve great uncertainty” (HC, 149). In IF, Russian-
speakers calculate even in times of great structural transfor-
mation–namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The remarkable difference between the two methods is
thus clear. In IF, Laitin starts with an apriori theory of indi-
vidual choices, as opposed to viewing choices as embedded
in a structural context, as was the case in HC. But is it neces-
sarily a problem? Is something lost in the process? Hopf (2006)
is sure about the great loss, as discussed below. I would like
to answer the question in two ways, one of which goes in the
direction of Hopf’s observation, but the other does not.
Hopf argues that if Laitin had allowed himself to be an
ethnographer a la HC, he would have found that the absence
of Russian ethnonational mobilization in the Near Abroad was
consistent with a variable “omitted” from the surveys: Soviet
identity. Decades of history had made Soviet identity a lived
everyday reality for Russians in the Near Abroad: “In under-
standing themselves as multinational, as Soviet, the ethno-
national axis of identification was simply not available, or sa-
lient, to millions of Russians living abroad. Therefore, they
did not understand themselves in opposition to Kazakhs,
Ukrainians and Estonians, in precisely that way, just as the
Yoruba did not mobilize along Christian and Muslim axes of
identification” (Hopf 2006, 18).
Notice the role structural context plays here in the exer-
cise of individual choices. Some choices are simply not part of
the institutionalized commonsense of politics because of how
history played itself out. Hopf’s central methodological in-
sight is that an a priori theory led Laitin to formulate his
survey questions in a way that ruled out this explanatory
possibility, and an ethnographic soaking and poaking would
have made it transparent.
If true, this is a very big conclusion, for it not only changes
how we explain the absence of Russian ethnonational mobili-
zation in the Near Abroad–as a result of each Russian calcu-
lating how other Russians will behave, as Laitin does, or as a
result of a historically produced choice pattern, as Hopf pro-
poses–but it also shows that an important potential substan-
tial explanation is eliminated by a method relying on apriori
assumptions.
In the end, the area experts will have to judge the veracity
of either claim. What those of us doing surveys in different
parts of the world can do is ask whether questions about a
possible Soviet identity were included in Laitin’s question-
naire–especially in an open-ended form which allows one to
watch against excessive theoretical determination of survey
questions. The way Laitin’s survey questions are reported in
the appendix of IF does not make it clear whether he did ask
questions about the possibility of a Soviet identity of Rus-
sians in the Near Abroad, and in what form.
If Hopf is right, he tellingly shows us the consequences
of a method driven by a priori assumptions, but I also wish to
argue that the same method has also generated some big ideas.
EIC by Fearon and Laitin is another example of an argument
based on apriori and universalist assumptions. It proposes
“in-group policing,” or “self-policing,” as a societal mecha-
nism of peace between diverse ethnic groups. The idea is de-
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ductively laid out, and Hopf is right that the theory is not
empirically tested.6
But the fact remains that it is a big and novel idea in the
field, and it has a huge empirical potential. The existing theo-
ries were either primordial (ancient hatreds), instrumental (po-
litical entrepreneurs mobilizing ethnicity for self-serving ends),
epochal (arrival of modernity), or institutional (consociational
or liberal democracies; voting systems, etc).7 Using a simple
insight that ethnic groups can monitor their own group mem-
bers much more easily than those of a different ethnic group,
Fearon and Laitin turned it into a serious theoretical proposi-
tion, elaborated with game theory.
I am empirically testing this theoretical idea in my current
project in 18 cities across Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Ni-
geria, and India, and the chances that some, if not all, of my
materials will bear it out are very high. My previous argu-
ments based on six cities in India had proposed a different
societal mechanism of peace–interethnic civic engagement,
especially in organizations (Varshney 2002). As my research
moves further, we will perhaps find out the conditions under
which in-group policing works as a mechanism, and condi-
tions under which interethnic engagement does. In short, even
though the theory that I will develop will not be universal, it is
the universalist assumptions and a deductive mode of theo-
rizing that produced the idea of in-group policing.  Fearon and
Laitin are certainly taking the world of knowledge forward.
How does this discussion relate to my central argument?
The same method that produced in-group policing as an idea
perhaps managed to rule out, if Hopf is right, the possibility
of a Soviet identity for the Russians in the Near Abroad. And
the method that identified the role of colonialism in producing
institutionalized commonsense in Yoruba politics cannot eas-
ily tell us why despite British attempts at creating or freezing
an institutionalized Hindu-Muslim divide through electoral
rules in India, South Indians managed to escape Hindu-Mus-
lim cleavages, instead getting intra-Hindu caste divisions as
the master narrative of politics (Varshney 2002). Recourse to
colonial practices resolves an intriguing puzzle about Yoruba
politics and generates a possible idea–contingencies of colo-
nial rule–for portability, without clinching it for all postcolonial
analytic sites. Historians had begun to zero in on this idea
elsewhere, but political scientists on the whole had not.8
Arguments and Statistical Testing
Let us now turn to statistical methods such as regression
analysis, and examine the idea of tradeoffs. In EICW, Fearon
and Laitin advance the argument about why civil wars occur
in a very important way. A widely discussed recent theory,
also based on statistical testing, had proposed that the odds
of civil war were strikingly correlated with  primary commodity
exports (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Primary commodities are
“lootable” commodities, and it is “greed” about these re-
sources that drive an insurgency, not “grievances” about eth-
nic discrimination, argued Collier and Hoeffler. Fearon and
Laitin disprove this argument conclusively.
But they run into some trouble when they test another
argument—the so-called modernist view of nationalism asso-
ciated with Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983), both of whom
attribute the emergence of nationalism to the rise of moder-
nity, and claim that nationalism was impossible before the
modern age, though their mechanisms are somewhat different
(printing press and capitalism for Anderson, and industrial-
ization for Gellner).
For a statistical testing of the modernist argument, Fearon
and Laitin needed variables that could measure modernity, or
proxy for it. Higher levels of per capita income became their
proxy for modernity (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78), and they
find that lower levels of per capita income increased the odds
of civil wars, not the other way round (83). Anderson and Gell-
ner, they concluded, were wrong.
Were they? There are two conceptual problems in the
way Fearon and Laitin formulated the test, partially inescap-
able due to the requirements of regression analysis. First,
both Anderson and Gellner made epochal arguments–argu-
ments that focused on a transformation of human conscious-
ness as it existed in the Middle Ages, once modernity arrived.
Higher or lower income of countries today–or since 1945–is
quite beside the point. Pre-modern times may have had lower
per capita incomes than modern times, but Anderson and
Gellner also talk about print capitalism and industrialization.
Their arguments are historically specific. The only way to
test their arguments is to explore whether before the birth of
the printing press and/or industry, national consciousness
existed.9 Second, the arguments of Gellner and Anderson are
about national identities, not nationalist civil wars. Having a
national identity does not necessarily imply a hunger for war.
Identities and wars are conceptually separable.
Thus, regression analysis is a good way to test some
theories, not all. Contemporary primary exports are easily quan-
tifiable at a large-n level, but how does one quantify the extent
of printing press penetration in a large number of cases in the
17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and their consequences for hu-
man consciousness? And if a large-n dataset cannot be cre-
ated, how can one run regressions? In the absence of large
datasets for the 17th through 19th centuries, one will have to
discover a small number of critical cases that show the rise of
national consciousness before the birth of the printing press
and/or industry. The debate between Gellner and Kedourie
goes precisely in that direction (Kedourie 1993, 136-144).
I hope it is now clear why we should not damn methods
as intrinsically superior or inferior, neither ethnography, nor
surveys, nor for that matter deductive work, whether concep-
tualized formally (as in game theory) or informally (as in the
writings, let us say, of a Rawls or an Elster). We should simply
recognize the potential and limits of each method, and we
should see whether the method proposed is suitable for the
problem at hand.10
This is true even in the natural sciences. Einstein famously
argued several decades back that physics and meteorology
will neither have the same methods, nor the same degree of
predictiveness. Physics typically studies a few variables in
interaction, allowing parsimony and predictive accuracy.
Meteorology has so many variables that having more power-
ful computers, which he saw coming, would only allow us to
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predict whether a broad area would get hurricanes in the week
or so ahead, not predict that months in advance and if closer
to time, not predict whether a specific town or village would
be hit and with what intensity. Einstein’s reasoning was clear:
it is the number of variables affecting the path and intensity of
a hurricane (or a snow storm) and their very complicated inter-
action that was at issue here, not our computing powers. Me-
teorological problems cannot be reduced to a few variables, as
in physics. Likewise, some problems in politics may well allow
the parsimony of physics, but others may be more like meteo-
rology, requiring very different kinds of conceptualization and
measurement.
I should add that my argument about methodological
choices entailing trade-offs is consistent with some new work
on methods, both of the quantitative and qualitative sort (Brady
and Collier 2004). It also underlines the value of methodologi-
cal pluralism in the social sciences. Methodological pluralism
is defensible not because anything goes, but because differ-
ent methods will do different things well.11
Further Implications
For Laitin, this argument has some further implications.
His movement from ethnography and case studies to sur-
veys, formal reasoning, and statistical testing should allow
him to deal with puzzles of a large variety. At the same time, his
denunciation of other people’s work in his more recent schol-
arly phase is puzzling and hugely paradoxical. Consider two
examples, one about case studies, another about selection on
the dependent variable.
Laitin finds case studies unacceptable unless the study
of a single country is “transformed into a high-n research
design, thereby increasing the scientific leverage” (Laitin 2003,
180). My argument with this reasoning is not that turning a
country study into a high-n design is wrong. Rather, I have
problems with Laitin’s insistence that that is the only way to
save case studies, or by extension, ethnographies, which tend
to study a village or a town.
Paradoxically, Laitin’s argument today amounts to de-
nouncing his old scholarly self, so evocatively in evidence in
HC. More generally, Laitin’s insistence ignores the fact that
case studies can contribute to cumulation by producing in-
triguing ideas, even when the n is equal to one. This is true of
critical cases, which even the more statistical view of King,
Keohane, and Verba (1994) accepts as valid. To recall, critical
cases are those that, given theory, you would least expect to
have outcomes that they do. With extensive low incomes and
widespread illiteracy, India should not have been democratic,
but it is. With little sanctity of private contracts, virtually no
restrictions on the powers of the state, and a highly underde-
veloped capital market, China should not have been an eco-
nomic dynamo for two and a half decades, but it has been.
India and China thus become critical cases for the theories of
democracy and economic growth. Theoretically unselfcon-
scious case studies are a problem, not country studies that
are not transformed into a high-n design.
 Laitin’s critique of studies that select on the dependent
variable is also oddly self-defeating (Laitin 2003, 179). It ig-
nores, first of all, the value of his own IF, where he studies
identity formation only in those parts of the former Soviet
Union where conflict was absent or low in the immediate post-
Soviet phase: Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. He
does not study the Chechen region, which had a lot of con-
flict and could have had very different identity outcomes.
Moreover, some of the most instructive social science
work in recent decades selects even more on the dependent
variable than Laitin does in IF. Sen’s Poverty and Famines
(1981) and Bates’ Markets and States in Tropical Africa (1981)
are the best examples. Both are widely viewed as classics of
the development field, and justly so. Sen’s theory of famines
was based on five famines; there were no half-famines or non-
famines in his research design. And as Rogowski pointed out
long ago (1995), Bates only studied agricultural stagnation in
Sub-Saharan Africa, not cases of agricultural success.12
It may be true that in most cases, it will be hard to clinch
an argument we want to make if we have no variation on the
dependent variable. But that is not the only way to contribute
to knowledge. Both Sen and Bates did two notable things.
First, they thoroughly undermined an existing conventional
wisdom: food availability decline as a cause of famine, and
Africa’s cultural taste for leisure over work, producing back-
ward bending supply curves instead of upward sloping ones,
leading to agricultural stagnation.13 Second, they put a new
idea on the table for others to work with: entitlement failures
as a cause of famine, as in Sen’s argument, and self-seeking
behavior of urban politicians, buying the rural rich through
subsidies, and running policies that hurt the countryside as a
whole, as in Bates.14
Research designs that select on the dependent variable
can often do both of these, and that is reason enough to see
them as contributions. Clinching theories in an ideal fashion
is one way to contribute; undermining existing popular theo-
ries and presenting elements of a new are another way.   Inter-
estingly, in IF, there is a point where Laitin says something
similar (Laitin 1998, 325), but he nonetheless attacks such stud-
ies elsewhere for they do not contribute to cumulation (Laitin
2003, 179).
Conclusion
Laitin has made remarkable contributions to our knowl-
edge, becoming a central figure in the subfield of ethnic poli-
tics. The kind of methodological evolution he has undergone
is also uncommon in the profession. For both of these reasons,
substantive and methodological, his scholarly output inspires
admiration. The admiration would be infinitely greater if he
could view methodological choices as consisting of tradeoffs
and could thereby view work emanating from methods not cur-
rently favored by him as also contributing to the cumulation of
knowledge, for which the intellectual case is quite clear. It will
also save him from self-inflicted paradoxes and contradictions.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Anna Grzymala-Busse, Ira Katznelson,
David Laitin and Daniel Posner for some penetrating comments on an
earlier version of the argument presented here.
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2
 For a fuller development of this distinction, see Varshney (2003b).
See also Isaiah Berlin, 1979.
3
 Whether Laitin should have engaged in four ethnographies, select-
ing a central site in each country, is an important issue, and worth
thinking about. But studying all four societies from the microcosm of
Narva would not have been methodologically valid.
4
 For some early thoughts on these lines, see Varshney, 2002, 19-
20.
5
 Whether this critique of rational choice theory is right is a differ-
ent point altogether. On what kind of rationality might apply to non-
marginal decisions like identity choices, see Sen (1982) and Varshney
(2003a).
6
 Only examples of an approving sort are listed by Fearon and
Laitin. See the empirical critique of Horowitz (2001, 475-6).
7
 A detailed elaboration of these traditions can be found in Varshney
(2002), Chapter 2.
8
 With the exception of Benedict Anderson (1983), especially in
his account of “Creole Pioneers.”
9
 Alternatively, can better proxies be developed for epochal argu-
ments? One should, of course, remain open to such possibilities.
10
 In one of his recent essays, Laitin (2003) appears to have partly
moved in this direction. He argues for a tripartite method: formal
reasoning, statistical testing, and narratives. But it is unclear whether
the ideal set forth has ever been realized, or can be. Moreover, consid-
erable paradoxes in that position also remain, as discussed later.
11
 On this matter, also see Laitin (2003) for a different view.
12
 To be fair to Bates, he does mention Kenya and Ivory Coast as
cases of relative agricultural success, but that account comes at the
end and is very brief. Basically, variation in outcomes is not the
centerpiece of the argument.
13
 See Varshney, 1995, Ch. 2, for how popular the theories of
backward bending supply curves were.
14
 This idea did have a prior lineage in Lipton (1977) and Schultz
(1980), but Bates provided the most convincing links between poli-
tics and economic outcomes. Lipton and Schultz assumed that the
urban bias of the political structure produced anti-agricultural out-
comes. Bates showed exactly the links worked.
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As Ted Hopf presented his paper at the symposium held
at the 2005 annual APSA meeting, provocatively titled “Being
David Laitin,” I felt as if I were in a chute on the 7½th floor of the
Marriott Wardman Park, ready to be discharged onto the New
Jersey turnpike. But I survived, enough so to offer the follow-
ing remarks.
The key substantive theme raised by the papers in the
symposium is the relationship of ethnography and a theory of
purposive action. In the 1950s, the eminent anthropologist
Frederic Barth encountered the work of John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern, and immediately saw the deep impli-
cations of their game theory for anthropology. He then wrote a
game theoretic essay (Barth 1959) analyzing chieftaincy poli-
tics among the Pathans. This was one of the few lead balloons
that Barth let fly in his distinguished career, and the anthropo-
logical field has steered clear of game theory ever since. But
the scholarly relationship between game theory and ethnogra-
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